| Keith Hart on Sun, 21 Jan 2007 04:49:44 +0100 (CET) |
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| <nettime> history lesson |
How do you teach history to a people who escaped from history, some of
whose intellectuals thought winning the Cold War was the end of history?
Hardt and Negri may have been wrong about trans-national Empire, but
they were right to see social democracy and neo-liberalism as political
responses to the depressions of the 1930s and 1970s. Our task is to
understand how the third depression, which is taking root now, has its
origins in the circumstances of the last one. My story is not greatly
informed by reading books, more by extrapolating from fragments of news.
Let's just say I made it up.
Cracks were already beginning to show in the West's post-war boom by the
beginning of the 1970s. The Vietnam War introduced financial instability
to world markets, as well as showing that American pretensions to global
hegemony had clay feet. When Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard
in 1971, leading to an eight-fold increase in the dollar price of gold,
the main winner was the US (which held more gold than anyone else); the
losers were countries (mostly poor) who held dollar deposits. The fixed
parity exchange rates system collapsed soon afterwards and money markets
as we now know them were invented in 1975, inaugurating the financial
flood that has since taken over world economy. But the second
twentieth-century depression was triggered off by the events of 1973.
This was when a new system for American control of the Middle East and
its oil was put in place. The Iraq war and whatever it is leading to
next are a response to the cascading failure of that system.
Israel's comprehensive defeat of the Arabs in the Yom Kippur war
established that it could be an effective military proxy for the US in
the Middle East. In the same year the OPEC countries, led by the Saudis
and dominated by a group of small countries in the Persian Gulf region
with a lot of sand and next to no people, formed a cartel to raise the
price of oil. Oil production was organized by American and one or two
European companies ("the seven sisters"). One might ask how an economic
disaster of this magnitude could be pulled off by a few Arab sheiks
sheltering under the military protection of the United States. The
acquiescence of the oil companies and the US government implies that
their interests were also served by what transpired. In this way the
Saudis became America's financial proxy in the Middle East.
The consequence of the oil price rise was an immediate reduction in
aggregate demand within the industrial economies, as consumers were
forced to pay substantially more for energy. The oil producers received
a windfall surplus that most of them could not spend, since their
populations were too small and there is a limit to how many fancy
weapons they could buy (the idea of building super-cities came later).
They made huge transfers to their patron, the US government, in the form
of purchasing Treasury bonds ($20 billions by the Saudis alone in the
first year of OPEC). This meant that American citizens were indirectly
financing additional government expenditures by paying more for gas, a
tax hike by the back door. There was still a lot of money left over.
This was deposited by the oil producers in the banking system, much of
it in the new off-shore Eurodollar market which offered higher interest
rates. In order to pay the interest the banks had to lend on the money.
There were few takers in the West, since the sharp reduction in demand
discouraged investment there. The communist bloc was not considered to
be suitable for investment at the time and had little to sell that the
rest of the world wanted. So the bankers turned to the Third World.
But first a digression on the communist bloc. Richard Nixon, before he
was evicted from office, made a sort of peace with Brezhnev's Soviet
Union, as well as with China. This opened up the possibility of trade
between East and West. Nixon's solution to the other side's lack of
purchasing power was the so-called "vodka-cola" strategy. There was no
way that Americans could drink enough vodka to pay for all the Coke that
the Russians would be buying. But the communists had plenty of docile
cheap labour at a reasonable level of skill. Their rulers could buy
western goods with the proceeds from selling that labour to western
corporations. So the Bretton Woods institutions made credit available to
the Poles and Hungarians to go in for joint sponsoring deals with these
companies, setting up factories to make clothes and similar items for
sale in the West. The hard currency earned by repressing their own
labour force was spent by the political elites in special shops for
whisky and Marlboro cigarettes that served to mark off their status from
the masses, who ate bread and potatoes, if they were lucky.
This system didn't take off until the 1980s, but there was still a snag.
World trade was rigged to prevent countries with cheap labour, like
Taiwan or Poland, undermining the sales of their high-cost western
competitors. North America and Western Europe erected tariff barriers
against such competition which were potentially prohibitive of the trade
envisaged by the vodka-cola strategy. A solution was found. When West
Germany signed the Treaty of Rome to join the European Common Market, it
was in the name of Germany as a whole; so that East Germany was in
theory a member of the western trading circle. Manufactures from the
communist bloc were shipped into the West through East Germany acting as
a sort of port-of-trade. When the Berlin Wall fell, several Eastern
European countries had accumulated billions of dollars in debts to
finance this scheme. The resulting popular governments then embarked on
a privatization programme that ruined their economies; and the attention
of the western powers shifted to doing what they could to protect their
trade and investment there.
If the oil price rise was bad for the industrial countries, it was a
full-scale disaster for non-oil producing Third World countries. These
had been encouraged by the World Bank and other international agencies
to concentrate on exporting a few primary products. The resulting
oversupply kept prices down, while rapid urbanization in their countries
raised demand for the manufacturing exports of the industrial countries.
As a result the terms of trade between the two blocs were worsening from
the perspective of the poor agricultural economies. The oil shock
depressed demand in the rich countries for Third World exports; yet when
the latter were faced with increased energy bills, all they could do was
try to sell more of their traditional exports, thereby driving down
world prices even further.
Into this desperate situation came the western banks looking for ways of
lending on the oil surplus. They found takers, of course, usually
corrupt leaders of bankrupt governments who were prepared to sign any
piece of paper to get their hands on some money. The premise of the
loans was that they would be invested in productive projects out of
whose yields the interest and capital repayments would be made. But more
often than not, the money went into private Swiss bank accounts or the
projects failed, as most "development" projects did at the time. By the
end of the 1970s there was a huge banking crisis, since Third World
debtors were in no position to pay off the loans. This was exacerbated
by the second oil price hike in 1979. The OPEC gains of 1973 had been
eroded in the meantime; so the producers tried to claw some of them
back. This time, the dollar was undermined and the Federal Reserve, now
headed by Paul Volcker, responded by raising interest rates to almost
20%. The subsequent regime of high interest rates coincided with the
shift from post-war Keynesian demand management to the "monetarist"
(sound money = deflationary) policies identified with Reagan and Thatcher.
The 1980s and afterwards saw a massive transfer of money from the Third
World to the West in the form of interest repayments that often amounted
to as much as a third of nation public revenues in any given year. This
drain of income from the poor countries was greater than any extracted
under previous colonial and neo-colonial arrangements; and it came when
their reserves had been wiped out by the dollar devaluation of 1971. The
International Monetary Fund and World Bank then imposed draconian
measures known as "structural adjustment", designed to reduce each
government's financial obligations and open up their economies to the
free flow of capital. The threat to the western banking system was
averted by a combination of rescheduling agreements (which only
increased Third World liabilities) and covert support to the most
vulnerable banks. The governments of poor countries were caught without
any alternative to playing along. In any case they had long ago
abandoned any sense of responsibility towards their own people in
exchange for dependency on their foreign creditors.
This catastrophe is the specific context for the further impoverishment
of Africa and similar regions of the world. The idea of "development"
was quietly dropped. The international agencies now had just one goal,
the survival of governments whose task is to supervise passively the
flow of money into the coffers of western banks and corporations. Aid
levels have been much reduced since the 1960s; indeed non-governmental
organisations of a bewildering number and variety have stepped in to
perform functions that neither Third World states nor their
international sponsors are prepared to undertake any more. But the
obscene transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich, honouring debts
contracted under highly dubious circumstances, reveals how far world
society has degenerated from the high ideals generated by the defeat of
fascism and the anti-colonial revolution in mid-century.
It might have been plausible at the millennium to represent all this as
a multi-lateral empire of Roosevelt's original design, but events since
9-11 have revealed the American Empire for what it is in the hands of
Bush and his neo-Nazi backers. The story speeds up and gets more
complicated as we enter the present. All I would suggest here is that
one interpretation of the first and second Gulf wars, as well as of the
third being currently launched against Iran, is that America's oil habit
has become increasingly threatened by the weakness of its two regional
proxies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both societies are imploding under the
political, military and economic contradictions they are built on. Bush
I used Iraq as an excuse to strengthen the US's military presence in the
Gulf, threatening the fig leaf of Saudi Arabia's independence; but Bush
II came to power committed to making Iraq a base for direct military
operations in the Middle East, knowing that the Saudis and Israelis
would not be able to hold out on their own for long. In the process,
they strengthened Iran and that is the next part of the story.
I have left out the camouflage provided by Armageddon in the Middle East
for the economic upheavals unleashed by the current devaluation of the
dollar in the face of a cumulative transfer of economic power from West
to East. It may be that the American public needs educating about its
own passive role in generating this nightmare. The rest of us had better
figure out where to take cover -- perhaps in cyberspace, on a mailing
list like this one or, failing that, in a library?
Keith Hart
www.thememorybank.co.uk
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